How Does the Accuracy of Geo-Location Technologies Affect the Law? by Svantesson, Dan Jerker B.
D. J. B. Svantesson: Accuracy of Geo-Location Technologies in Law
HOW DOES THE ACCURACY OF GEO-LOCATION 
TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT THE LAW?*
by
DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON**
Geo-location technologies allow website operators to identify the geographical loca-
tion of those who visit their websites. Having knowledge of an access-seeker’s geo-
graphical location means that they can provide content targeted to that location.  
This has several uses. For example, it enables the website operator to:
I. Provide advertisements relevant for the access-seeker’s particular location;
II. Restrict access to content that may be unlawful in certain jurisdictions;
III. Restrict access to content that the website operator is licensed to provide only in  
a limited geographical area; and
IV. Avoid entering into transactions with people from locations known to be “fraud  
hot-spots”.
The accuracy of geo-location technologies is obviously of fundamental import-
ance  for  all  these  uses.  However,  the  consequences  of  providing advertisements  
aimed at the wrong location may be far less serious than, for example, failing to re-
strict access to content that the website operator is licensed to provide only in a lim-
ited geographical area. In situations where a website operator seeks to rely on the  
use of a geo-location technology to argue that it has met its legal obligations, the ac-
curacy levels of the geo-location technology used may indeed be determinative.
* This paper draws upon several other publications on the topic of geo-identification. See in 
particular: Svantesson, D. 2004 ‘Geo-location technologies and other means of placing 
borders on the ‘borderless’ Internet’, John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information 
Law, Vol XXIII, No 1, pp. 101 – 139, and Svantesson, D. 2007 ‘Geo-identification and the 
Internet – A New Challenge for Australia’s Internet Regulation’, Murdoch E-Law Journal 
Vol 14, No 2, pp. 155 – 177.
** Associate Professor, Faculty of Law Bond University (Australia). E-mail: 
Dan_Svantesson@bond.edu.au, Website: www.svantesson.org.
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Having provided a brief overview of how geo-location technologies work, this  
paper examines how accurate they are. As part of that discussion, recommendations  
are made for how courts ought to approach the use of geo-location technologies.
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INTRODUCTION [1]
I first attended Masaryk University’s Cyberspace conference in 2004. At that 
occasion I spoke about so-called geo-identification. Geo-identification is the 
practice  of  identifying  Internet  users’  geographical  location.  This  can  be 
achieved in a number of ways. Most significantly, it can be done be technic-
al means without the Internet users’ knowledge.
Since my 2004 conference paper, I have continued to research legal as-
pects of geo-identification. In this paper, I will provide an update of some 
developments since my 2004 paper. Particular focus is placed on the accur-
acy of geo-location technologies.
HOW DOES IT WORK? [2]
My 2004 paper titled “Geo-location Technologies – A Brief Overview” gave 
an overview of how technical means for ascertaining Internet users’  geo-
graphical locations work. Seeing how the rest of this paper requires some 
knowledge of this issue, I will provide a very brief repetition here.
Currently, the most relevant form of geo-location technology is based on 
the translation of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses into geographical  loca-
tions, by the use of information stored by the provider of the geo-location 
service. As the access-seeker enters the appropriate Uniform Resource Loc-
ator (URL) into his/her browser, or clicks on the appropriate hyperlink, an 
access-request is sent to the server operating the requested website. As the 
server receives the access-request, it, in turn, sends a location request (e.g. 
forwards the access-seeker’s IP address) to the provider of the geo-location 
service. The provider of the geo-location service has gathered information 
about the IP addresses in use, and built up a database of geo-location in-
formation. Based on the information in this database, the provider of the 
geo-location service gives the website server an educated guess as to the ac-
cess-seeker’s  location.  Armed with  this  information,  the  web  server  can 
provide the access-seeker with the information deemed suitable (e.g. a mes-
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sage along the lines of: “Sorry. This website is intended for the people of 
Czech Republic only”, or perhaps provide advertisement specifically  tar-
geted at people from the access-seeker’s particular location). There are cur-
rently several products on the market utilising this type of systems1. This 
technology is not necessarily prohibitively expensive, nor is it particularly 
difficult to operate.2
THE ACCURACY [3]
The accuracy of sophisticated geo-location technologies is difficult to gauge. 
So far, there is a paucity both of independent studies, and of occasion where 
a court has evaluated the accuracy of geo-identification. One of the most im-
portant cases, in this context, is the French Court’s judgment in the Yahoo! 
case.3 There, experts concluded that “it may be estimated in practice that 
over 70% of the IP addresses of surfers residing in French territory can be 
identified as being French.”4
In the Nitke v Ashcroft case,5 the Court was again assisted by expert testi-
monies. One such expert, Seth Finkelstein concluded that:
A provider  of  content  via  the  Internet  cannot  reasonably  be  expected to  
know the location of readers, if the context is one in which location would  
lead to a denial of the ability to read the content.
This is because material can be read on the Internet through many alternate  
geographic routes, where the content can intentionally be relayed through  
third party intermediaries which act to mask and obscure location. Further,  
intrinsic inaccuracies such as changes in address assignment and proxying  
1 See e.g. http://www.quova.com/, and http://www.digitalenvoy.net/.
2 The author does not have sufficient information, and is anyhow not qualified, to 
independently assess the accuracy of these products. But, for example Geobytes’ product is 
available from $500 US per annum, appears easy to operate (see demo: 
http://www.geobytes.com/demo.htm), and the producers argue that the product is accurate 
to 97% on country-level and 75-80% on city-level. See further: http://www.geobytes.com/.
3 International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA) and the Union of French Jewish 
Students (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc. County Court of Paris, interim court order of 20th of November 
2000.
4 International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA) and the Union of French Jewish 
Students (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc. County Court of Paris, interim court order of 20th of November 
2000. However, it would seem that one of the experts, Ben Laurie, later felt a need to explain 
his statement. (Laurie, B. ‘An Expert’s Apology’, at http://www.apache-ssl.org/
apology.html at 14 August 2007.
5 Nitke v. Ashcroft, 253 F.Supp.2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. Mar 24, 2003) (NO. 01 CIV. 11476 (RMB).
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by such large providers as America Online (AOL) means many users can-
not be reliably located.6
Despite this, providers indicate the potential accuracy to be very high. 
For example, Digital Element claims that their product NetAcuity is over 
99.9% accurate at  a  country level  and over  94% accurate at  a  city-level.7 
Quova – another leading provider of geo-location technologies – state that: 
“In audited tests [carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers] using large, in-
dependent third party data sets of actual web users, Quova’s country-level 
accuracy was measured at 99.9% and its US state-level accuracy at 95.0%.”8
Such impressive statistical figures have been criticised.
The way the vendors arrive at their accuracy statistics is to cross-check the  
physical location of sampling of Internet users (as determined by their soft-
ware) against customer provided locational information already in the pos-
session of  the software  vendors.  There is  no way to independently verify  
whether the software could provide the claimed levels of accuracy if the soft-
ware vendors didn’t first have other customer location information which  
their software may be using to determine customer location. Put somewhat  
differently, it is as if a “psychic” claimed to be able to accurately know what  
card a customer held in their hand 99.5% of the time, and to prove it, the  
psychic would ask to see the cards in the hands of a sampling of customers  
before announcing that indeed those were the same cards he knew the cus-
tomers to possess.9
Furthermore,  some  producers  of  geo-location  technologies  appear  to 
base their accuracy rates on the risk that their positive guesses are incorrect. 
Imagine,  for  example,  that  the operator  of  a  Swedish  website  wished to 
make the website accessible to people located in Sweden only. A provider 
of a geo-location technology may state that its product is accurate to 99%, 
referring to the fact that, of the people the technology identifies as located in 
Sweden, 99% of them will actually be located in Sweden (i.e. the number of 
6 Expert testimony by Seth Finkelstein (10 November, 2003) 
http://sethf.com/nitke/ashcroft.php at 14 August 2007.
7 http://www.digital-element.com/ip_intelligence/ip_intelligence.html at 10 August 2007.
8 http://www.quova.com/page.php?id=132 at 10 August 2007.
9 Information Technology Association of America, ‘ECommerce Taxation and the Limitations of  
Geolocation Tools’, at http://www.itaa.org/taxfinance/docs/geolocationpaper.pdf 5 February 
2007. While the details of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ audit are not publicly available, it is 
possible that this criticism does not apply to the statistics presented by Quova, if the 
reference information was completely disconnected from Quova’s data collection.
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false positives is 1 in 100). However, this figure does not say anything about 
the rate of false negatives; that is, it does not reveal how many people, actu-
ally located in Sweden, will be refused access. It is, thus, similar to claiming 
to be able to tell if a person is male or not with 99% accuracy, and then only 
nominate people with extensive facial hair as males – the number of false 
positives is likely to be very low, while the number of false negatives may 
be high. Consequently, courts must be wary of accuracy rates presented by 
manufacturers of geo-location technologies.
In addition, when assessing the accuracy of methods for geo-identifica-
tion, it is important to avoid placing the focus on the marketing-driven aver-
age accuracy-rates presented by the companies behind the method in ques-
tion, and instead pay attention to the context-specific accuracy rate.
If a company were to assert that its method is, for example, ‘98% accurate’  
on  average  across  all  its  applications  involving  analysis  of  locations  
throughout the world, it is likely that the accuracy rate for Canadian and  
American location distinctions alone is lower than 98%, given the unique  
difficulties in this context.10
Placing the focus on context-specific accuracy rates will inevitably com-
plicate and increase the cost of court proceedings in that expert evidence 
may be required in each individual case. However, the importance of ensur-
ing that the courts base their decisions on the accuracy rate that is relevant 
in the particular case at hand cannot be overstated. In other words, the first 
advice I provide to judges faced with disputes involving the use of geo-
identification is to encourage the use of expert witnesses testifying as to the 
context-specific accuracy rate for the case at hand.
There is a range of factors affecting the accuracy of geo-location techno-
logies. Due to the dual nature of the geo-location process, these factors can 
be divided into two categories: ‘source problems’ and ‘circumvention prob-
lems’.
10 Edelman, B. ‘Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Retransmissions of Over-
the-air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users’, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf at 14 August 2007, at 6. The “unique difficulties” Mr 
Edelman speaks of are multiple. First, a number of ISPs offer their services in both US and 
Canada. Second, the proximity and economic ties between the two countries means that 
many companies have offices in both countries. Third, the widespread use of intranets with 
a single access point to the Internet. Fourth, communication between Canada and the US is 
not particularly likely to pass through well-known “peering points” or contain the telltale 
transoceanic time delays.
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The  source  problems  are  the  problems  associated  with  building  up 
and/or  collecting  accurate  geo-location  data.  In  relation  to  IP  addresses, 
there is currently no real equivalent to the address registers listing physical 
addresses,  or  the  phone  registers  listing  phone  numbers.  Consequently, 
those engaged in creating databases of geo-location information must rely 
on other, less straightforward, methods. Obviously, the accuracy of the ma-
terial in the geo-location databases depend on, and can never be better than, 
the accuracy of the collected data. Common methods of collecting relevant 
material include, for example, gathering data from registration databases,11 
network routing information, DNS systems, host name translations, ISP in-
formation and Web content.12 As discussed in detail by Edelman, all of these 
sources may provide inaccurate information.13
Turning to circumvention problems, it can be noted that, while some cir-
cumvention techniques are technologically advanced (e.g. deep linking to 
streaming video content without accessing the HTTP server),14 others are 
easy enough to be used by virtually anyone (e.g. anonymising techniques)15 
or even inherent in the system-structure (“tunnelling methods”).16 With this 
in mind, it will presumably always be possible to circumvent geo-location 
technologies.
Arguably the easiest way to circumvent the type of geo-location techno-
logies described above, is  through the use of so-called anonymisers.  An-
onymisers  are applications designed to allow web-users to visit  websites 
anonymously. Anonymisers act as an added layer – a buffer – between the 
web-surfer and the websites she/he visits. When a web-surfer uses an an-
onymiser, her/his IP number is only transmitted to the provider of the an-
onymiser. She/he is then assigned a new IP number by the anonymiser in 
11 I.e. Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (http://www.ripe.net at 5 February 
2007, American Registry for Internet Numbers (http://www.arin.net at 5 February 2007, Asia 
Pacific Network Information Centre (http://www.apnic.net at 5 February 2007 and Latin 
American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry (http://lacnic.net at 5 February 2007.
12 See e.g. Internet Geography Guide – A NetGeo White Paper (can be requested from: 
http://www.netgeo.com/ at 5 February 2007.
13 Edelman, B. ‘Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Retransmissions of Over-
the-air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users’, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf at 14 August 2007, at 3-7.
14 Ibid at 10.
15 Ibid, at 8. For some examples of anonymising services, see e.g.: EPIC Online Guide to 
Practical Privacy Tools http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html at 5 February 2007.
16 Ibid at 9.
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relation  to  any  websites  she/he  visits  while  applying  the  anonymiser.  It 
needs to be stressed that these applications were not developed for the pur-
pose of circumventing geo-location technologies.  However, by identifying 
the  location  of  the  anonymiser  (or,  more  specifically,  the  location  with 
which the IP numbers assigned by the anonymiser are associated), one may 
be able to find anonymisers from the country one wishes to appear to be 
located in. For example, when using an anonymiser called The Cloak,17 I was 
assigned an IP number (216.127.72.7) indicating my location as being the 
US, while when using an anonymiser called  Anonymouse,18 I was assigned 
an IP number (82.96.100.100) indicating my location as being Germany.
The number of anonymisers available is limited, and thus there are only 
a limited number of countries one can appear to be located in, using such 
applications. However, the use of so-called proxy servers opens up further 
possibilities. A bit simplified, a proxy server is a server that sits between the 
web-browser and the server being accessed. Thus, just like the anonymisers 
discussed above, a proxy server acts as a buffer between the web-surfer and 
the websites visited. The main difference is that while the anonymisers are 
web-applications, the use of proxy servers is determined by the settings in 
the web-browser. Using a proxy server to circumvent geo-location technolo-
gies, involves two easy steps. First it is necessary to obtain the address (with 
its port number) of a proxy server from the country you wish to appear to 
be located in. Then the browser settings must be changed to the obtained 
proxy address (with its port number). For example, users of Microsoft’s In-
ternet Explorer can change their proxy server setting by first clicking on In-
ternet Options under Tools, and then clicking on LAN Settings under Connec-
tions.
A few words of warning must, however, be said in this context. Some 
proxy servers, and anonymisers, can log all information that passes through 
them. In other words, all the web-surfer’s traffic can be accessed by the op-
erator of the anonymiser or proxy server. Thus, it is not advisable to send 
passwords or credit  card details  through a proxy server,  or anonymiser. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that, due to the common usage of corporate 
firewalls, people connecting to the Internet using a computer connected to 
17 http://www.the-cloak.com/login.html at 5 February 2007).
18 http://anonymouse.org/anonwww_de.html at 5 February 2007).
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the network of a larger institution, such as a university or a company, may 
not be able to use proxy servers in the manner outlined above.
When discussing how the effectiveness of IP based geo-location techno-
logies is affected by the availability of anonymisers and proxy servers, it is 
to be noted that  the producers of  IP based geo-location technologies  are 
working to identify the servers providing the anonymising services.19 Once 
identified, the value of the anonymising tool for circumventing geo-location 
technologies is obviously limited.
Furthermore, proxy servers are frequently victims of their own success. 
Once a proxy server  becomes widely  used,  it  may be  exposed to heavy 
traffic loads slowing it down, or even causing it to stop functioning. Once 
slowed down, it usefulness is lowered and its users may turn to other prox-
ies instead. For this, and other reasons, proxy servers are generally speaking 
not very reliable. A proxy server available one day may be gone the next.
It is also important to note that there are different kinds of proxies. For 
our purposes, the most important distinction is between so-called transpar-
ent and non-transparent proxy servers. While the latter type caters for a de-
gree of anonymity, the former does not as it “does not modify the request or 
response beyond what is required for proxy authentication and identifica-
tion”.20
One last  observation must  be made when assessing the usefulness  of 
proxy servers. While it is relatively easy to use proxy servers, the average 
Internet user is unlikely to have the technical knowledge to do so. However, 
in 2001, Edelman speculated as to the future of geo-identification and noted 
that: “geographic analysis tools are likely to suffer in effectiveness due to 
the increasing availability of automated tools and generally-known meth-
ods for bypassing security systems.”21 As a result of a research project fun-
ded by a  Bond University Vice  Chancellor’s Research Grant,  one such auto-
mated tool is now available for free on the website on which I present my 
research findings – www.svantesson.org. It takes the form of a download-
able toolbar which allows the user to select to surf through a range of third-
19 See e.g. http://www.quova.com/page.php?id=43 at 5 February 2007.
20 RFC 2616, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#page-46 at 14 August 2007.
21 Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Retransmissions of  
Over-the-air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf at 14 August 2007, at 11.
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party proxy servers. The list of proxy servers the user can chose from is up-
dated regularly and it includes information about which country the user 
will appear to be located in.
The second advice I offer to judges faced with a dispute involving the 
use of geo-identification is that they need to take great care in relation to the 
issue of ‘leakage’. It will presumably always be possible to circumvent geo-
identification and it is therefore unreasonable to demand that e.g. website 
operators use technologies that are leakage-free. The courts must focus on 
what is reasonable in the circumstances.
In their excellent paper, Internet Geolocation and Evasion,22 Muir and van 
Oorschot provide a framework for understanding the various attempts at 
evaluating  the  accuracy  of  geo-location  technologies.  They  note  that  we 
must separate three different problems. The first problem is to “[d]etermine 
the geographical location of an Internet user, given a connection attempt or 
content request initiated by that user”.23 This is a representation of what we 
what to gain from geo-identification, and when sceptics state that geo-loca-
tion technologies simply do not work, they focus on this question. In con-
trast, when the providers of geo-location technologies discuss their accuracy 
levels, they refer to what Muir and van Oorschot introduce as Problem 2; 
that is, the problem of determining “the geographical location of the Inter-
net device using a given IP address”.24 This problem is different since it is 
disconnected from the question of the location of the user as it focuses ex-
clusively on the location of the device which may not necessarily  be the 
computer from which the user is  accessing the Internet.  To link the two 
problems, Muir and van Oorschot introduce Problem 3 – determining “the 
IP address of an Internet end-user’s device, given a content request initiated 
by that user.”25 An example can usefully illustrate the significance of these 
distinctions.
Imagine that you are located in Tokyo, and access the Internet from a 
computer located there. Using a proxy located in Copenhagen you connect 
to a web server located in Istanbul. Should that web server be using a geo-
22 Muir, J. A. and van Oorschot, P. C. ‘Internet Geolocation and Evasion’ (10 April 2006), at 13. 
http://www.ccsl.carleton.ca/~jamuir/papers/TR-06-05.pdf at 7 August 2007.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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location technology, we can link the scenario to the three problems outlined 
above. Problem 2 relates to the geo-location technology’s ability to connect 
the IP address, provided by the proxy, to a geographical location. In our ex-
ample, that location – Istanbul – clearly has nothing to do with the end-
user’s  actual  location.  If,  however,  the geo-location technology can over-
come the third problem, it will have ascertained the IP address of your com-
puter located in Tokyo. It can then proceed to the task of dealing with prob-
lem one; that is, linking the IP address of the end-user device (i.e. your com-
puter in Tokyo) with a geographical location.
This brings me to the third advice I offer to judges faced with disputes 
involving the use of geo-identification. It is crucial that the courts take care 
to properly appreciate the technical nuances involved. This is of course true 
in  any  context,  but  it  seems  that  the  rapid  development  of  technology 
causes particular difficulties.
CONCLUDING REMARKS [4]
Since 2003, I have been talking about how geo-identification will change the 
Internet.  I  have repeatedly  suggested that  geo-identification will  become 
widely adopted, and as more and more content becomes geographically re-
stricted, the Internet will lose one of its most important and valuable charac-
teristics – its ‘borderlessness’. In other words, geo-identification may have 
the consequence of making the Internet more similar to the ‘real world’ di-
vided by so many borders of different kinds. Perhaps it could be said that 
we are currently witnessing the concept of sovereign nation states being im-
posed on the Internet, at the expense of the Internet’s global nature. This is a 
classic example of how the undefined interest of the masses is overrun by 
the defined interest of a few – it is in most peoples’ general interest that the 
Internet remains borderless, but a small group of advertisers, broadcasters, 
intellectual property owners and security personnel have a very specific in-
terest in a geographically divided Internet.
However, as of yet, there seems to be no evidence of a widespread adop-
tion  of  geo-identification,  and certainly  no  widespread  adoption  of  geo-
identification that risks having a severe impact on the Internet’s borderless 
nature. Consequently, I accept that my credibility as a ‘doomsday prophet’ 
is waning. At the same time, I note that several main Internet actors have 
started using geo-identification, that investment in geo-identification con-
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tinues, that new geo-identification products are being developed, that geo-
identification can be easily and cost effectively done, that aspects of the law 
is structured in a manner that encourages the use of geo-identification, that 
the law has started to take account of geo-identification and that geograph-
ical location always matters in trade and other human interaction. Thus, I 
am still convinced that we have only seen the tip of the iceberg so far – geo-
identification will increase in use, with the inevitable consequence that lar-
ger and larger parts of the Internet becomes less borderless. In this context I 
offer my fourth and last advice to judges faced with disputes involving geo-
identification. The courts must bear in mind the policy implications of their 
judgments.  A judgment to the effect that a website  operator is  protected 
against a lawsuit in a particular jurisdiction, if she/he has used appropriate 
geo-identification tools to avoid visitors from that jurisdiction, will clearly 
make the use of geo-identification more attractive. As highlighted above, 
the increased use of geo-identification comes at a great cost to the useful-
ness of the Internet.
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